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Abstract 
Human mobility in the context of climate change is a complex issue, which has been addressed through 
different approaches, frameworks, and proposed solutions. This research differs from previous studies. It 
attempts to demonstrate the importance of taking a holistic approach. To do so, it focuses on analysing the 
European Union’s response to the issue and the factors that have influenced it. The research finds that the 
EU’s response to human mobility in the context of climate change has been patchy, under-developed and 
generally inadequate. Although the EU has shown some interest in the topic, the climate-migration nexus 
is mostly mentioned in relation to policies aimed at tackling the root causes of migration and avoiding 
displacement and irregular migration. Very little has been done to facilitate more regular migration path-
ways as a way to provide options to those living in areas severely affected by climate impacts, and nothing 
has been put in place to ensure effective protection in Europe of people displaced in relation to climate 
change. The EU case study shows the importance of responding to climate-related mobility in a compre-
hensive manner and argues for more advocacy and policy-oriented research to bring elements of climate 
justice back into the discussion and to “re-politicise” the issue. 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
COP Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
DG Home European Commission Directorate General for Migration and 
Home Affairs
DG Clima European Commission Directorate General for Climate Action
DG ECHO European Commission Directorate General for European Civil 
Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
DG DevCO European Commission Directorate General for International Co-
operation and Development
DRR Disaster Risk Reduction
EC European Commission
EEAS European External Action Service
EP European Parliament
EU European Union
GAMM EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
GCM Global Compact on Migration 
GCR Global Compact on Refugees 
GEF Green European Foundation
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons IDPs
MS Member States
NI Nansen Initiative
PDD Platform for Disaster Displacement 
QR Qualification Regulation
SWD European Commission Staff Working Document on “Climate, 
environmental degradation and migration” (2013)
TFD Task Force on Displacement
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TPD Temporary Protection Directive 
UNEP United Nations Environment Program
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
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1. Introduction
The interaction between climate change and human mobility has been a hot topic in academia and policy 
for more than two decades, with very different approaches, framings, and numerical projections being 
used, and several different solutions proposed. What is certain, though, is that climate change acts as an 
important driver of migration and displacement and will increasingly do so if the climate crisis is not rapidly 
addressed.
Those most impacted or at risk are people living in countries with high levels of exposure to disasters and 
other climate-related events and limited means to adapt to climate change due to underlying causes such 
as political and socio-economic factors.1 
While the majority of climate-related movements are and are expected to remain internal, an increase in 
cross-border movements is also predicted, especially affecting people living in small islands or low-lying 
areas, or occurring as a type of secondary movement, frequently as a reaction to deficient durable solutions 
to internal displacement.2
Human mobility related to climate change is a complex and multi-dimensional issue, with climate change 
just one of the factors influencing mobility patterns. Such multi-causality represents an important conun-
drum when it comes to identifying protection options for those who move across borders. While many 
studies and debates have revolved around the protection issue, other aspects are also crucial when study-
ing human mobility in the context of climate change. These include identifying measures to be taken in the 
countries of origin to prevent forced displacement, and others that require collaboration between coun-
tries of origin and destination to ensure mobility options that provide real solutions to the affected people, 
their communities of origin and the countries of destination. Considerations related to responsibility for 
climate change and the rights of most affected people should also play a role when discussing possible 
solutions to ensure a fair and human-centred response. 
This paper differs from previous studies in that it attempts to demonstrate the importance of taking a ho-
listic approach to human mobility in the context of climate change. To do so, it focuses on the European 
Union’s (EU) response to the issue as a case study.
The choice of the EU as a case study is based on multiple factors. First, EU Member States (MS) are among 
the biggest contributors to greenhouse gas emissions since the industrial revolution and the EU is one of 
the world’s leading donors for humanitarian aid and development cooperation. It is therefore important to 
assess how such a big player in the international arena with such a heavy weight of responsibility for the 
climate crisis has dealt with the topic of climate-related human mobility. Second, migration is a burning 
topic in Europe, traditionally and even more so in the last few years, after a temporary surge in the number 
of arrivals in 2015 and the nationalist and anti-migrant rhetoric that ensued, often fuelled by opportunistic 
far-right populist parties.3 As a consequence, it is important to analyse whether the climate-related dimen-
sion of movements towards Europe has been considered at all in the broader migration debate and in the 
current policies. Finally, this research attempts to fill the gap occasioned by the scarcity of recent and com-
prehensive studies on the EU response. 
In this study, I pay special attention to the internal dimension of climate-related movements, namely to 
how the EU has been addressing in-bound human mobility in the context of climate change. The is pri-
marily because the protection of cross-border disaster displaced people is an area where major legal and 
policy gaps exists at national, regional, and international level. In addition, since migration is increasingly 
seen as a form of adaptation to the worst impacts of climate change, I analyse whether the EU has taken 
this aspect into account when designing labour mobility schemes and regular migration pathways. On the 
1  Greenpeace, Climate change, migration and displacement – The underestimated disaster (2017); available at: https://www.greenpeace.de/
sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/20170524-greenpeace-studie-climate-change-migration-displacement-engl.pdf
2  Nansen Initiative, Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the context of Disasters and Climate Change (Protec-
tion Agenda), Volume I. (2015); available at: https://nanseninitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/PROTECTION-AGENDA-VOLUME-1.pdf
3  See for example R. Wodak, The Politics of Fear. What right-wing populist discourses mean (Sage, 2015).
The response of the EU to human mobility in the context of climate change 5
contrary, knowing that the EU is a leading humanitarian and development donor, and assuming that the 
EU policies to provide assistance to IDPs do not differentiate on the basis of the reasons for displacement, 
I have chosen not to focus my analysis on the EU response to internal displacement related to climate 
change in third countries. 
The rest of this chapter clarifies terminology and describes the methodology used. The second chapter re-
views several academic studies on the issue of human mobility in the context of climate change, including 
sources that take the broader angle of environmentally induced migration and displacement. The third 
provides an overview of the most recent policy frameworks addressing human mobility in the context of 
climate change. The fourth chapter analyses how the EU has responded to the issue, while the fifth chapter 
identifies several factors that might have influenced that response, and the last chapter presents the con-
clusions.
1.1 Scope and terminology
 
Because of the complexity of the issue, there is no single term to refer to the problem. This paper generally 
uses the phrase “human mobility in the context of climate change”. Used by several authors and interna-
tional organizations,4 the phrase takes a comprehensive view of human movements related to climate 
change as it includes displacement (understood as primarily forced movements), migration (understood as 
primarily voluntary movements) and planned relocations (understood as planned processes to settle per-
sons or communities to a new location away from areas at risk of severe climate impacts).5 “In the context 
of” is also a more nuanced way to describe the relation between human mobility and climate change, as it 
avoids establishing causal and exclusive links, which are inaccurate in most contexts. However, for simplic-
ity, this paper sometimes refers to the issue with the term “climate-migration”, “climate-displacement” or 
“climate-related mobility”, depending on the context. 
The thematic scope of this study is human mobility in the context of climate change because it is a global 
and urgent phenomenon with far-reaching impacts. It is also a problem whose causes and responsibilities 
are clearly established, something that is relevant when discussing responses to human mobility. However, 
it is undisputed that often climate change interacts with other environmental factors as a driver of migra-
tion. It is also a fact that in many cases displacement related to climate change follows the same patterns 
and generates the same needs as displacement caused by non-climate related disasters. For these reasons, 
this paper uses sources that take a broader view at the problem and uses other framings such as “environ-
mental migration” or “disaster displacement”.
While the literature review does not have temporal limitations, the scope of the analysis of policy frame-
works and of the EU response is limited to the last ten years. However, references to crucial previous docu-
ments is made when relevant.
1.2 Methodology
 
This study is primarily based on a combination of primary and secondary sources. The analysis of the EU 
response is grounded in academic or think tanks’ studies and on the analysis of relevant official documents 
issued by the European Commission (EC), the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of the EU. The pur-
pose of analysing EU official documents was to identify whether climate-related mobility was mentioned 
and, if so, to assess how it was framed and which solutions were proposed. Key EU official documents 
among the categories listed below were analysed:
- documents on climate change
4  See for example  S. Nash, ‘Knowing human mobility in the context of climate change’, Movements – Journal for Critical Migration and 
Border Regime Studies (2018) 4(1); available at: https://movements-journal.org/issues/06.wissen/04.nash--knowing-human-mobility-in-the-con-
text-of-climate-change-the-self-perpetuating-circle-of-research-policy-and-knowledge-production.html; Advisory Group on Climate Change and 
Human Mobility, ‘Human mobility in the context of climate change. Recommendations from the advisory group on climate change and human mo-
bility COP20 Lima, Peru’,  (2014); available at: https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/pbn/docs/Human-Mobility-in-the-context-of-Climate-
Change.pdf
5  Nansen Initiative, Protection Agenda, 2015, n 2.
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- documents on migration policy
- documents on development cooperation and humanitarian aid policies
- EU positions on: a) the negotiations of the Global Compact on Migration (GCM), b) the work of the 
Task Force on Displacement (TFD) within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and c) within the Nansen Initiative and Platform for Disaster Displacement (PDD).
The desk research was complemented with five interviews with key experts. Four are staff members of EU 
institutions, while the other one was identified for his knowledge of policy processes such as the NI/PDD 
and GCM and the EU engagement with them. All the interviewees chose to remain anonymous. 
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2. Literature review
This chapter reviews the academic debate around human mobility in the context of climate change, in-
cluding points of view that take the broader angle of environmentally induced migration and disaster 
displacement. It attempts to provide an overview of how different authors have dealt with the complexity 
of the issue. It identifies the main schools of thought in framing the issue and highlights some individual 
important perspectives that should be considered to ensure comprehensive, just, and human rights-cen-
tred responses. The debates and views illustrated in this chapter are also relevant to understand how most 
recent intergovernmental policy forum have been dealing with this issue (see chapter 3) and to contextu-
alize and analyse the response of the EU (chapter 4 and 5). 
2.1 Main schools of thought on climate-related mobility
 
As documented by Piguet,6 the connection between the environment and human mobility became a topic 
in academia and policy circles from around the mid-1980s, especially with the publication of three major 
reports.7 These reports raised the interest of environmental and natural science scholars who highlighted 
the risk of mass displacement as the direct or indirect consequence of environmental degradation, and 
climate change in particular. The best-known is Norman Myers, who investigated how climate change-re-
lated effects, combined with population growth, would drive people living in densely populated, low lying 
areas to migrate and fuel conflicts over resources.8 
The concept of “environmental refugee”9 and the connection established by Myers between environ-
mental degradation/climate change, migration and conflicts led to the development of the “maximal-
ist” or “alarmist” school of thought and the “securitization” approach to climate migration, which was 
adopted by several scholars, think-tanks and institutions active in the field of security studies. For exam-
ple, Homer-Dixon raised the spectre of environmental refugees spilling across borders and destabilising 
recipient countries and negatively affecting “international stability”.10 Migration was described both as a 
consequence of environmental conflicts and as the cause of conflicts over natural resources.11 This school 
of thought saw environmental migration mostly as a security threat from the global South to the global 
North requiring a security response “through agendas of military intervention, development and mod-
ernisation”.12 This contributed to strengthening the arguments in favour of the securitization of migration 
in general.13 Such views proved very influential among policy-makers, as they re-appeared in later reports 
and statements by several institutions, including the EU.14
However, researchers from the field of migration studies took a “minimalist”15 view of the problem, dis-
missing the climate or environmental refugee label by highlighting the multi-causality of migration and 
6  E. Piguet, ‘From “Primitive Migration” to “Climate Refugees”: The Curious Fate of the Natural Environment in Migration Studies’ (2013) 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 103(1), 148.
7  E. El-Hinnawi, ‘Environmental refugees’ (1985) United Nations Environmental Program; J. Jacobson, ‘Environmental Refugees: a Yardstick 
of Habitability’ (1988) Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 8(3), 257; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change – The IPCC 
Scientific Assessment (1990), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8  J. Morrisey, ‘Environmental Change and Forced Migration - A State of the Art Review’, (RSC, 2009); available at: https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/
files/files-1/dp-environmental-change-forced-migration-2009.pdf.
9  The term was first used by El-Hinnawi in 1985. See F. Gemenne, ‘How they became the human face of climate change. Research and pol-
icy interactions in the birth of the ‘environmental migration’ concept’ in E. Piguet, A. Pecout, P. De Guchteneire (eds.) Migration and climate change 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011).
10  T. Homer-Dixon: ’On the Threshold. Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict’, (1991) International Security 16(2), 76; ‘Environ-
mental Scarcities and Violent Conflict. Evidence from Cases’ (1994) International Security 19 (1), 5.
11  Gemenne, 2011, n 9.
12  R. Cooper et all, ‘Being(s) framed: The means and ends of framing environmental migrants’ (2015) Global Environmental Change 35, 106, 
110.
13  M. J. Trombetta, ‘Linking climate-induced migration and security within the EU: insights from the securitization debate’ (2014), Critical 
Studies on Security, 2(2), 131.
14  German Advisory Council on Global Change, ‘Climate Change as a Security Risk’  (2008); available at: http://ccsl.iccip.net/wbgu_jg2007_
engl.pdf; High Representative and European Commission to European Council, ‘Climate Change and International Security’ (2008), Paper to the 
Council of the European Union, S113/08. 
15  For the distinction between “maximalists” and “minimalists”, see Gemenne, 2011, n 9; Piguet, 2013, n 6.
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the difficulty of isolating environmental factors as the exclusive cause of human mobility.16 They ques-
tioned the methodology used by Myers and others to predict the size of the future “environmental refugee” 
population and advanced that the spectre of hordes of “environmental refugees” could just be a myth 
unsupported by data from empirical studies and statistics of the time and inspired by neo-Malthusian nar-
ratives. They also pointed out that presenting environmental migration as the movement of masses of poor 
people from the global South, was not only unfounded but also dangerous, as it could fuel the anti-immi-
grant rhetoric of parties and governments and lead to even tougher border control measures.
Nevertheless, the “climate (or environmental) refugee” framing was also used by several scholars, mostly 
from an environmental law background,17 to advocate for protection-like approaches. They advanced 
specific legal solutions to enhance the protection and assistance of “climate (or environmental) refugees”. 
For all, the starting point is the observation that international law is utterly inadequate to protect this cat-
egory of people on the move and this is something that needs to be remedied, especially in the light of 
the projected exponential increase in the number of people forced to move due to environmental change. 
Some authors and the government of the Maldives in 2006 therefore advocated the expansion of the ref-
ugee definition by amending the 1951 Refugee Convention.18 Others, more mindful of the challenges of 
the previous approach, suggested adopting a separate international legal instrument.19 While their views 
diverged on several issues, what all these authors have in common is the recognition that climate change 
and environmental degradation are global man-made phenomena, which trigger responsibilities from the 
international community towards those most affected by its impacts. So, all their proposals suggested an 
institutional and legal framework for protection with dedicated resources for its implementation. They also 
all viewed human mobility in the context of climate change as being limited to forced displacement and 
focused their attention in designing almost exclusively ex-post interventions. 
Starting from a similar framing of “climate refugees” as victims in need of international protection and as-
sistance, other authors rather took a climate justice approach, based on the premise that people forced 
to move due to climate change are victims of the reckless conduct of the most polluting countries, which 
therefore bear a heightened responsibility to receive and support “climate refugees”.20 These authors’ main 
distinctive feature is that they build their arguments around a “victim/perpetrator dichotomy”.21 When they 
use the “climate refugee” label, they do so for political rather than legal reasons.22 While the proponents of 
international legal instruments limit the role of the international community mostly to provide funding 
for resettlement, humanitarian assistance to home and host countries or displaced people themselves, 
authors adopting a climate justice framework put forward concrete proposals to ensure that states most 
responsible for climate change take more responsibility for assisting “climate refugees”, by resettling them 
in their own countries and/or providing adequate and proportional contributions to a “loss and damage” 
fund. 
16  See for example R. BILSBORROW, ‘Rural Poverty, migration, and the Environment in Developing Countries: Three Case Studies’ (1992), 
Background paper for World Development Report; available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/777691468767386516/Rural-pover-
ty-migration-and-the-environment-in-developing-countries-three-case-studies ; G.KIBREAB, ‘Environmental causes and impact of refugee move-
ments: A critique of the current debate’ (1997) Disasters, 21 (1), 20; R. BLACK, ‘Environmental refugees: myth or reality?’ (2001), UNHCR Working 
Paper No. 34; available at: https://www.unhcr.org/uk/research/working/3ae6a0d00/environmental-refugees-myth-reality-richard-black.html; S. 
CASTLES, ‘Environmental change and forced migration: making sense of the debate’ (2002), UNHCR, Working Paper No 70; available at: https://
www.unhcr.org/en-lk/3de344fd9.pdf
17  Gemenne, 2011, n 9.
18  M. Conisbee, and A. Simms, ‘Environmental Refugees: The case for recognition’ (2003), New Economics Foundation; available at: https://
neweconomics.org/uploads/files/e3cd1b834fc83fb11e_9pm6bkf32.pdf; M. Chemillier-Gendreau, ‘Faut-il un statut international de réfugié écolo-
gique ?’ (2006) Revue Européenne de Droit de l’Environnement, 4, 446; A. Williams, ‘Turning the tide: Recognizing climate change refugees in interna-
tional law’ (2008) Law & Policy, 30(4), 502
19  F. Biermann and I. Boas, ‘Preparing for a warmer world: Towards a global governance system to protect climate refugees’ (2010), Global 
Environmental Politics, 10(1), 60; B. Docherty and T. Giannini, ‘Confronting a rising tide: a proposal for a convention on climate change refugees’ 
(2009), Harvard Environmental Law Review, 33, 349; D. Hodgkinson and all  “The hour when the ship comes in”: A Convention For Persons Displaced 
By Climate Change, (2010), Monash University Law Review, 36(1), 69; CRIDEAU (Interdisciplinary Centre for Research in Environmental Law, Land and 
Urban Development) and all, ‘Draft Convention on the status of environmentally displaced persons’, Fourth Version (2018); available at: https://
cidce.org/en/deplaces-environnementaux-refugies-ecologiques-environmentally-displaced-persons/
20  R. Eckersley, ‘The common but differentiated responsibilities of states to assist and receive ‘climate refugees’’ (2015) European Journal of 
Political Theory, 14(4), 481; R. Kuusipalo, ‘Exiled by Emissions - Climate Change Related Displacement and Migration in International Law: Gaps in 
Global Governance and the Role of the UN Climate Convention’ (2017), Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, 18, 614; R. Buxton, ‘Reparative Justice 
for Climate Refugees’ (2019), Philosophy, 94(2), 193.
21  Cooper et all, 2015, n 12.
22  Eckersley, R. (2015), n 20, 492.
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While, influenced by the “minimalist” approach, several authors from the migration and forced migration 
field of studies have been focusing on the conceptual challenges related to the definition, the quantifi-
cation and the solution of the problem in itself, others have opted for a more empirical or “pragmatic” 
approach, focusing on assessing the relationship between environmental change and migration through 
empirical data, either by using quantitative methods to weight the impact of the environmental changes 
on migration in particular countries, or by conducting large surveys with the aim of “collecting data on 
past or current migration, environmental pressure, and socioeconomic context”.23 The development of the 
state-led Nansen Initiative, together with the allocation of funds for research on the topic by the EU and 
specific governments,24 provided opportunities to develop such knowledge through a wealth of empirical 
studies.25 
These studies confirmed many of the minimalists’ arguments, showing that environmental factors, includ-
ing climate change, do influence migration choices, not in a direct, deterministic manner, but rather as part 
of a what Van Hear and all call “driver complexes”, in which environmental reasons interplay with cultural, 
political, economic and social factor and processes at local, national and international level.26 They also 
indicated that climate-related mobility is largely internal and, when it occurs across border, it generally 
affects neighbouring or culturally proximate countries.27 Some specifically highlighted the dynamics which 
lead some people to be forced to stay, despite adverse environmental conditions, because of the lack of 
human, social and economic capital to face a migration journey, especially internationally, and stressed the 
importance of dedicating special attention to those “trapped populations” in disaster preparedness and 
climate change adaptation programs.28
A crucial finding of empirical studies was that migration in the context of environmental change is not 
necessarily a measure of last resort but can be a pondered decision and an important coping strategy for 
households who seek to diversify their income in the time of environmental and economic adversity. That 
led to crafting the notion of “migration as adaptation”29, which is intimately connected with the develop-
ment approach to migration. 
The concept was revolutionary in many ways. Rather than victims in need of protection and assistance, 
it viewed people on the move as active agents of change capable of taking conscious decisions about 
whether to move, and when, where and who from the family should move. Human mobility in the context 
of climate change was no longer equated with displacement, but the importance of the voluntary dimen-
sion in migration outcomes was recognised. From being something negative to be prevented or feared, 
under the “migration as adaptation” approach climate-migration is seen as a positive and normal phenom-
enon, and even a solution to the adverse impacts of climate change, which therefore needs to be facilitated 
and praised as a transformational opportunity. 
A significant shift in conceiving solutions also occurred, with the focus moving from protection and as-
sistance after displacement to a preventative approach. The underlying idea is that, since migration is 
unavoidable and can even offer important adaptive opportunities to migrants, their families and theirs 
communities of origin, it is crucial to facilitate it through managed migration approaches which includes 
concepts of labour and circular migration, upskilling and remittances.30 Correspondingly, a shift in anchor-
23  Piguet, 2013, n 6, 156.
24  See for example the EU-funded EACH-FOR project; available at: https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/projects-activities/each-envi-
ronmental-change-forced-migration-scenarios_en and the British-funded Foresight report; available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/287717/11-1116-migration-and-global-environmental-change.pdf
25  R. McLeman, and F. Gemenne, ‘Environmental migration research: Evolution and current state of the science’ in Routledge Handbook of 
Environmental Displacement and Migration (Routledge, 2018).
26  N. Van Hear and all, ‘Drivers of migration’, (2012) Migrating out of Poverty Research Programme Consortium - Working Paper 1; available 
at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08a7fed915d622c000787/WP1_Drivers_of_Migration.pdf  
27  R. Obokata and all, ‘Empirical research on international environmental migration: a systematic review’ (2014) Population and Environ-
ment, 36(1), 111.
28  R. Black and all, ‘Climate change: Migration as adaptation’ (2011), Nature, 478, 447.
29  R. McLeman and B. Smit, ‘Vulnerability to climate change hazards and risks: crop and flood insurance’ (2006), Canadian Geographer/
Le Géographe canadien, 50(2), 217; C. Tacoli, ‘Crisis or adaptation? Migration and climate change in a context of high mobility’ (2009), Environment 
and urbanization, 21(2), 513; J. Barnett and M. Webber, ‘Migration as adaptation: opportunities and limits’ in J. Mcadam (ed), Climate change and 
displacement: multidisciplinary perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2010); Black and all, 2011, n 28.
30  Cooper and all 2015, n 12.
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age of climate-migration can also be observed, with the “climate refugees” approach being generally an-
chored in the fields of either security or humanitarian emergency management while “migration as adap-
tation” finds its roots in development and human security theories.31
Despite its attractiveness, the “migration as adaptation” approach has also attracted a wealth of criticism. 
Many authors maintained that the benefits of “migration as adaptation” can be overrated and its cost un-
derstated, especially referring to the social and economic cost that migration can have on households, 
the observation that remittances can exacerbate existing inequalities and vulnerability in the context of 
disasters32 and the lack of gender analysis when researching the impacts of remittances.33 Others pointed 
out that the insistence on individuals’ agency and resilience masks links with neoliberal strategies, in which 
the individual is left alone to deal with adverse impacts of climate change and find the best coping strategy 
by themselves. 34   
Some authors also expressed concerns that the “migration as adaptation” approach could lead to letting 
wealthier countries off the hook and lead to a de-politicisation of climate-related human mobility. 35 By 
normalising migration as a positive adaptation strategy, it reduces pressure on states to mitigate climate 
change as a way to diminish the need for people to move.36 It also obfuscates climate justice arguments, 
since the “wrongs” of climate change are ignored, while the attention almost exclusively focuses on the 
opportunities available to individuals.37 From rights-holders, individuals become just resilient subjects with 
the responsibility of adapting. Conversely, states’ role shift from that of duty-bearers obliged to mitigate 
climate change and to provide remedy to people forced to move due to climate change to the simpler role 
of facilitating people’ adapting capacity.
2.2 Human rights-based perspective and attempts to “re-politicise” the issue 
 
Some authors have brought up the importance of human rights-based approaches and the need to re-
politicise the issue.  
For example, concerning rights-based arguments, McAdam claimed that proposals for an international 
legal instrument to protect “climate refugees” may be “not necessarily respond to communities’ human 
rights concerns, especially those relating to cultural integrity, self-determination and statehood”.38 Similarly, 
preoccupied by the passive role of migrants under approaches to climate-migration excessively focused on 
protection, Zetter argued that the aim of protection-like responses should be both to safeguard vulnerable 
people and to defend the “rights of migrants to deploy their agency”.39 
Building on these considerations, McAdam, Klepp and Herbeck have been advocating for national and re-
gional responses, particularly using solutions adopted in and within Pacific small-island states as case stud-
ies. In particular, inspired by regional negotiations on-going among Pacific states to deal with climate-mi-
gration, Klepp and Herbeck stressed the importance of encouraging solutions which “take climate justice 
aspects into account”, and are “emancipative” for migrants and “migration friendly”.40 
31  G. Bettini and all, ‘One step forward, two steps back? The fading contours of (in) justice in competing discourses on climate migration’ 
(2017) The Geographical Journal, 183(4), 348.
32  Cooper and all, 2015, n 12; Bettini at all, 2017, n 31.
33  G. Gioli, and A. Milan, ‘Gender, migration and (global) environmental change’ in R. McLeman and F. Gemenne (eds), Routledge Handbook 
of Environmental Displacement and Migration (Routledge, 2018). 
34  See for example G. Bettini, ‘Climate migration as an adaption strategy: de-securitizing climate-induced migration or making the unruly 
governable?’  (2014) Critical Studies on Security, 2(2), 180; C. Methmann and A. Oels, (2015) ‘From ‘fearing’to ‘empowering’climate refugees: Gov-
erning climate-induced migration in the name of resilience’, Security Dialogue, 46(1), 51; A. Baldwin, ‘Climate change, migration, and the crisis of 
humanism’ (2017), Wiley interdisciplinary reviews: climate change, 8(3), 460.
35  Methmann and Oels, 2015, n 34; Bettini and all, 2017, n 31.
36  Methmann and Oels, 2015, n 34.
37  Bettini and all, 2017, n 31; S. Klepp, Climate change and migration’ (2017) Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Climate Science; available at: 
https://oxfordre.com/climatescience/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228620.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228620-e-42?rskey=m1moJE&result=6
38  J. McAdam, ‘Swimming against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is Not the Answer’ (2011), International Journal of 
Refugee Law, 23(10), 2, 17.
39  R. Zetter, 2010, ‘Protecting people displaced by climate change: some conceptual challenges’ in J. McAdam (ed.), Climate change and 
displacement: multidisciplinary perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2010), 149.
40  S. Klepp and J. Herbeck, ‘The politics of environmental migration and climate justice in the pacific region; (2016) Journal of Human Rights 
and the Environment, 7(1), 54; S. Klepp, 2017, n 37.
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Some authors reached the conclusion, which I very much support, that a rights-based framework necessi-
tates avoiding using different approaches to climate-migration in isolation, but rather adopting a combina-
tion of approaches that can best protect rights and foster migrants’ agencies in all contexts and situations. 
For example, McNamara and all show how unhelpful it is to present climate-induced relocation as either an 
adaptation strategy or a manifestation of “loss and damage”.41 They explain that only by considering them 
under both approaches, is it possible to design solutions that truly protect rights and respond to the needs 
of those concerned. Others42 supported the “toolbox approach” adopted by the Nansen Initiative and its 
successor, the PDD, in which legal and policy solutions are identified at national and regional level to re-
duce the need for people to move, facilitate voluntary migration as an adaptation strategy, and protect the 
rights of those displaced. 
Concerning the importance of re-politicising the intersection between climate change and human mo-
bility, Zetter and Morrisey used case studies to illustrate the political dimension of issues that influence 
“(im)mobility decisions” such as the distribution of social and political power at national and local level.43 
Going a step forward, Cooper et al. identified a less mainstream way of framing the environmental migrant 
which is that of a “political subject”.44 Such framing is built on the understanding that constraints related to 
unequal power relationships can limit people’s mobility choices in times of environmental adversity, but 
it also stresses migrants’ capacity to challenge these structures and claim their place in decision-making 
processes that affect them.
In a similar spirit, other authors have highlighted the political nature of disasters, and in particular states’ 
responsibilities, not only in causing climate change, but also in maintaining certain groups of people in 
situation of marginalisation and discrimination which heighten their vulnerability to disasters. Scott used 
these arguments to encourage innovative ways to consider eligibility for refugee status.45
In a comparable attempt to re-politicise the climate-migration nexus, especially after being reduced to 
a technocratic issue under the “migration as adaptation” framework, Gemenne re-considered the use of 
the “climate migrants or climate refugee” label, especially to promote awareness of the impacts of climate 
change or to stress the responsibility that we, as humans who have contributed to climate change, have 
towards those who feel compelled to move.46
These views are extremely important to help shaping comprehensive responses that are not only work-
able for states and international organisations but also mindful of the rights and the needs of those most 
affected, while also taking into account the political nature of climate change and climate-related human 
mobility. 
41  Karen McNamara and all, ‘The complex decision-making of climate-induced relocation: adaptation and loss and damage’, Climate Poli-
cy, 18|(1), 111.
42  See for example J. McAdam and all ‘International Law and Sea-Level Rise: Forced Migration and Human Rights’ (2016), University of New 
South Wales Law Research Paper No 60; available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2834832
43  R. Zetter and J. Morrisey, ‘The Environment-Mobility Nexus: Reconceptualizing the Links between Environmental Strees, (Im)mobility, 
and Power’ in E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and all (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (Oxford University Press, 2014).
44  Cooper an all, 2015, n 12.
45  M. Scott, ‘Finding agency in adversity: Applying the refugee convention in the context of disasters and climate change’ (2016), Refugee 
Survey Quarterly, 35(4), 26.
46  F. Gemenne, ‘One good reason to speak of ‘climate refugees’ (2015), Forced Migration Studies, 49, 71.
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3. Relevant policy frameworks
 
The academic debates and empirical research illustrated in the previous chapter have profoundly influ-
enced the way in which intergovernmental organisations have dealt with the issue of climate-related mo-
bility. This chapter briefly reviews how the topic has been considered in the most recent policy-making 
spaces, namely the Nansen Initiative and its successor, the PDD, the Task Force on Displacement under the 
UNFCCC and the Global Compact on Migration.  
The Nansen Initiative is a state-led consultative process established in 2012 by Norway and Switzerland 
and aimed at “build[ing] consensus among states on key principles and elements to protect people dis-
placed across borders in the context of disasters caused by natural hazards, including those linked to cli-
mate change.47 The Initiative’s main outcome was the adoption in October 2015 of the Protection Agenda, 
endorsed by 109 states, whose main contributions is to promote a comprehensive approach to disaster 
displacement. The PDD, which took over from the Nansen Initiative after the adoption of the Protection 
Agenda, is tasked with supporting states and other stakeholders in the implementation of the Agenda.48 
The Task Force on Displacement was set up in 2015 under the UNFCCC Warsaw International Mechanism on 
Loss and Damage.  It was tasked to develop recommendations on measures “to avert, minimize and address 
displacement related to the adverse effects of climate change”.49 The recommendations were adopted at 
COP24 in 2018, and the Task Force is now supporting states to implement them.50
The GCM, adopted at an intergovernmental conference in December 2018, represents the first internation-
al agreement setting a “common approach to international migration in all its dimensions”.51 It is also the 
first time that an international instrument on migration recognizes the link between migration and disas-
ters, environmental degradation and climate change.52  Despite being careful not to mention “international 
protection”, the GCM represents the most solid recognition in an international migration instrument that 
forced movements of people due to disasters and climate change need to be addressed through preven-
tative actions, measures aimed at facilitating movement in dignity and others aimed at providing solutions 
to those unable to return to their countries of origin. However, due to its non-binding nature and the 
prevalent anti-migrant rhetoric in western states, several doubts remain with regards to the willingness of 
states to implement it.53
While these three initiatives vary considerably in terms of nature, composition, ways of working and fo-
cus, they seem to align around a similar framework to deal with human mobility in the context of climate 
change. This is articulated around three pillars: a) reducing the need for people to move, b) facilitating man-
aged migration and, as a last resort, planned relocations to safer areas as a way to avoid forced movements, 
c) providing solutions to those displaced.
47  The Nansen Initiative, Towards a Protection Agenda for People Displaced Across Borders in the Context of Disasters and the Effects of Climate 
Change, www.nanseninitiative.org/secretariat/
48  See https://disasterdisplacement.org/the-platform/our-response 
49  See UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.21, 29 January 2016, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 49. It is worth noting that during the nego-
tiations for the Paris Agreement, developing and least developed states included a reference in the draft text to the establishment of a “climate 
change displacement coordination facility”, that would have provided support for emergency relief, assisted in providing organized migration and 
planned relocation, and undertaken compensation measures. However, due to the opposition of developed countries, parties had to settle for the 
Task Force, which was designed with a much less operational role and more as an advisory body. On this see J. McAdam, ‘From the Nansen Initiative 
to the Platform on Disaster Displacement: Shaping International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement’, University of New 
South Wales Law Journal, 39(4), 2016, 1518.
50  The recommendations are available at ; available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp24_auv_ec%20wim.pdf. For the 
latest Terms of Reference for the Task Force, see https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/TFD_ToR.pdf
51  See https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/migration-compact. The GCM, and the sister Global Compact on Refugees, result from the New 
York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, adopted by the UNGA in September 2016 (UN Doc. A/RES/71/1).
52  W. Kälin, ‘The Global Compact on Migration: a ray of hope for disaster-displaced persons’ (2018), International Journal of Refugee Law, 20. 
Of the GCM’s 23 objectives, objectives 2 and 5 are particularly relevant. In particular, objective 2, dedicated to “minimiz[ing] the adverse drivers and 
structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin”, includes a sub-section on “natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate 
change and environmental degradation”. Objective 5, which focuses on “enhanc[ing] availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration”, 
includes relevant mechanisms to facilitate admission and stay of people who are compelled to leave their countries due disasters and climate 
change. 
53  The US, Australia and several European states withdrew from the negotiations or refused to adopt the final text. See S. Fella, ‘The United 
Nations Compact for Migration’ (2019), House of Commons, Research Briefing CBP-8459; available at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/
research-briefings/cbp-8459/
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Firstly, there seems to be consensus among the three policy initiatives that preventative actions are crucial 
both to avert displacement and to allow people to stay in their places of habitual residence. These mea-
sures include mitigating climate change, as well as supporting people to adapt to its unavoidable effects 
and strengthening disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures. For this purpose, the integration of human mo-
bility considerations in national plans such as National Determined Contributions,54 National Adaptation 
Plans and national DRR plans plays an important role. 
Secondly, the three policy frameworks seem to accept that in managed migration and, as a last resort, 
planned relocations can be effective ways to minimize forced movements. This is clearly anchored in the 
theory of “migration as adaptation”. 
Thirdly, the three initiatives are also aligned on the understanding that, despite the preventative actions 
described above, a certain amount of displacement will be inevitable, especially as the impacts of climate 
change intensify. It follows that effective solutions need to be identified to address displacement and re-
spond to the needs of those displaced. While the TFD is less specific on this point, the NI/PDD and the GCM 
identify the need to multiply and harmonize the practices already existing in some countries to allow ad-
mission, stay and non-repatriation of those compelled to move due to disasters and climate change. 
In addition, the three policy frameworks seem to be inclined towards developing solutions at bilateral, 
sub-regional, and regional level more than at international level. This is a very pragmatic approach and 
one that could bear most fruit in the long term, including in terms of paving the way to codification under 
international law.
Finally, while the three policy frameworks provide a multi-prong approach to climate-related mobility, 
they lack a climate justice angle, and particularly the recognition that, especially when it comes to climate 
change, not all states bear equal responsibility and that those most responsible should also step up in their 
role to provide effective solutions to avert, minimize and most of all to address displacement.
54  Under the Paris Agreement, state parties are due to submit Nationally Determined Contributions to the UNFCCC Secretariat, indicating 
the national target for emission reductions and the actions to meet that target.
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4. The EU response
4.1 introduction
 
The previous chapter showed the alignment of different policy initiatives around a similar framework for 
responding to human mobility in the context of climate change, articulated around three pillars. Here I 
refer to these three pillars with the terms used by the TFD: “averting”, “minimizing”, and “addressing” cli-
mate-related displacement. 
In this chapter, I use this framework to study how the EU has been responding to the issue of human mobili-
ty in the context of climate change over the last decade, analysing policy positions and legal developments 
at the EU level in each of those three areas. 
4.2 Averting displacement
 
Averting displacement is “understood as measures to reduce or avoid the risk of forced and unmanaged 
migration as much as possible. Measures may include: disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation 
and mitigation, resilience building and community stabilization”.55
EU institutions have long acknowledged climate change and environmental degradation as important 
drivers of migration and displacement. 
Initially, EU institutions were influenced by “maximalist” approaches described in chapter 2 of this study 
and viewed climate and environmental-related migration as a threat to national security. For example, in a 
1999 Resolution, the EP warned how environmental factors were increasing the incidence of so-called “en-
vironmental refugees” and how this phenomenon would put pressure on EU policies such as migration, de-
velopment and humanitarian aid and would increase instability including, indirectly for the EU.56 Similarly, 
in a 2008 paper from the High Representative and the EC, “environmentally-induced migration” is listed as 
one of the threats related to climate change, on the assumption that “such migration may increase conflicts 
in transit and destination areas” and that the “substantially increased migratory pressure” to be expected in 
Europe would negatively impact Europe’s stability.57   
As the migration–development nexus emerged in EU policy discourse,58 since the early 2010s, EU institu-
tions have predominantly seen climate-related mobility as an issue pertaining to development cooper-
ation and humanitarian assistance,59 even though the framing of environmental migration as a security 
threat continues to be used in some official EU documents, such as the Council of the European Union’s 
conclusions on European Climate Diplomacy between 2016 and 2020.
This framing first became evident in the 2013 Commission Staff Working Document (SWD) on “Climate, 
environmental degradation and migration”,60 which still remains the only EC document dedicated to the 
topic. The SWD bases its arguments on the Foresight report’s findings that environmental migration is and 
will be mostly internal and will mostly occur within the Global South. As a result, the SWD concentrates 
most of its analysis and recommendations to EU policies with an external focus, including on development, 
foreign policy and humanitarian aid.
Although the development approach differs from the securitization one as it emphasizes the positive con-
tributions of migration, the EU has used the development-migration nexus mostly  “as a means to control 
55  International Organisation for Migrations (IOM), ‘Mapping Human Mobility and Climate Change in Relevant National Policies and Institu-
tional Frameworks’ (2018), WIM Task Force on Displacement Activity I.1, 6; available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/20180917%20
WIM%20TFD%20I.1%20Output%20final.pdf
56  European Parliament,  Resolution on The Environment, Security and Foreign Policy (1999); available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A4-1999-0005+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN#Contentd1030708e346
57  N 14, 4.
58  S. Lavenex and R. Kunz, ‘The Migration-Development Nexus in EU External Relations’, (2008), Journal of European Integration, 30(3), 439.
59  M. Mayrhofer and M. Ammer, ‘People Moving in the Context of Environmental Change: The Cautious Approach of the European Union’ 
(2014), European Journal of Migration and Law, 16(3), 389.
60  SWD(2013) 138 final
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migration better”61 and to craft interventions that can reduce the risk of people having to move, therefore 
preventing people coming to Europe.62 
As my analysis will reveal, this approach is reflected in the fact that that the majority of references to the 
climate-migration nexus in EC’s documents are found in relation to the need to tackle climate change vul-
nerability as a way to address some of the root causes of migration and displacement. 
For example, in the 2011 Communication on the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), 
which sets out the overarching framework of the EU’s external migration policy, the Commission referred 
to climate change only as an increasing  driver of migration and displacement and considered that “ad-
dressing environmentally induced migration, also by means of adaptation to the adverse effects of climate 
change should be considered part of the Global Approach”.63 
Similarly, the 2015 Agenda for Migration, recognizing that “civil war, persecution, poverty, and climate 
change all feed directly and immediately into migration”, reaffirmed that preventing and mitigating these 
threats is of primary importance to addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displace-
ment in third countries.64 Equally, the 2020 Communication on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum stat-
ed that addressing the challenge of climate change, alongside work to inter alia reduce poverty, promote 
human development, democracy and peace, “can all help people feel that their future lies at home”.65
Also the Council of the EU, in its Conclusions on European Climate Diplomacy after COP21, stated that “by 
further analysing climate vulnerability links with fragility and security risk, the EU will be in a better position 
to identify areas where combined risks are particularly high and where there are critical opportunities for 
conflict prevention and resilience, including in the context of a wider migration challenge”.66
In international fora in which the climate-migration nexus has been specifically debated, the EU has been 
also particularly vocal concerning the need to address the root causes of migration as a way to avert dis-
placement. 
For example, in a speech endorsing the Nansen Initiative’s Agenda for Protection in 2015, the EU represen-
tative, recalling the different root causes of forced displacement and migration including climate change, 
stressed the intention to “join up” EU actions aimed at tackling root causes, and praised the Nansen Initia-
tive for “addressing some of these root causes in very practical and well-conceived ways”.67 
In its negotiating position for the GCM, the EU also prevalently dealt with the climate-migration nexus in 
relation to addressing the drivers of migration. In particular, the EU’s input to the UN Secretary-General’s 
report informing the Zero Draft of the GCM recommended, inter alia: enhancing climate risk assessment to 
better predict the impact on migration; integrating human mobility and migration management into DRR 
policies, preparedness and early-warning mechanisms and climate change adaptation strategies; address-
ing drivers of migration through an integrated approach to conflict and crises. 68
In the context of the UNFCCC negotiations on loss and damage, the EU also stressed the need for a “com-
prehensive response to the link between climate change and mobility, addressing at once security, climate 
resilience, disaster risk management, food security, natural resource management, and environmental 
degradation and sustainable urban/rural development”.69  
61  Lavenex and Kunz, 2008, n 58, 443.
62  Ammer and all, ‘Time to act - How the EU can lead on climate change and migration’ (2014) Heinrich Böll Stiftung; available at: https://
eu.boell.org/en/2014/06/12/time-act-how-eu-can-lead-climate-change-and-migration
63  COM(2011) 743a final, p. 7.
64  COM(2015) 240 final, p. 7.
65   COM(2020) 609 final, p. 20. COM(2020) 609 final, pp. 19-20.
66  Council of the European Union (2016), Doc. 6061/16, p. 5.
67  Statement by Dominic Porter, Deputy Head of the European Union Delegation to the United Nations in Geneva (2015) in Nansen Initia-
tive,  Global Consultation, Conference Report, 12-13 October 2015, 11; available at: https://www.nanseninitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/
GLOBAL-CONSULTATION-REPORT.pdf
68  See https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/stocktaking_eu.pdf
69  Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union,  Submission on behalf of the European Union and its Member States, on 
views in the context of activity (a) of the strategic workstream (e) of the five year rolling work plan of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw Inter-
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What this long non-exhaustive list shows is an abundance of references by EU institutions to the need to 
avert displacement through a “root cause approach”. While this is a very important tactic, it is not in itself 
sufficient to fully address the needs and protect the rights of people facing the worst impacts of climate 
change. Moreover,  as the next chapter will show, the “root cause approach” to deal with irregular migration 
and displacement, has proved to be limited, especially if its main objective is migration control rather than 
the protection of rights of people at risk of displacement.
4.3 Minimizing displacement
 
Minimizing displacement is understood as measures to avoid forced displacement by facilitating human 
mobility in a way that is orderly and as beneficial as possible for the affected people, the communities left 
behind and those receiving them. Such measures may include ensuring regular migration pathways or, as 
a last resort, planning relocations of people living in high-risk areas, internally or cross-border.70 
The analysis of most recent EU documents on migration policy, as well as negotiating positions within the 
GCM and the UNFCCC, reveals some awareness on the part of the Commission, and even more so of the 
Parliament, about the need to increase regular migration pathways. This is motivated mostly by the under-
standing that, due to European demographics, migrants are necessary to sustain the European economy 
and its welfare system.71 There is also the acknowledgement that “well-managed migration” can reduce the 
incentives for people to enter the EU irregularly.72
However, my analysis also shows a very limited degree of recognition that enhancing pathways for safe, 
regular and orderly migration towards Europe is particularly important to provide alternatives to people 
living in areas severely affected by climate change and environmental degradation, who might otherwise 
be then forcibly displaced. With the exception of a 2013 position paper by the Greens in the European 
Parliament, the issue of regular migration pathways and the response to human mobility in the context of 
climate change remain largely unconnected.73
In the 2013 SWD, the Commission seemed to embrace the “migration as adaptation” approach as it argued 
that “facilitating well-managed mobility and labour migration from environmentally degraded areas can 
represent an effective strategy to reduce environmentally-induced displacement” and that the potential of 
migration to contribute to adaptation “should be fully exploited, including through measures to promote 
well-managed legal mobility”.74 Similarly, the 2013 Communication on Maximizing the Development Im-
pact of Migration of May recognized “the role of migration as a strategy to strengthening adaptation and 
household resilience”.75  However, the measures suggested by the Commission in the SWD only refer to 
promoting regular migration among third countries, neglecting the need for Europe to also provide more 
regular migration avenues to those at risk of being forcibly displaced by the effects of climate change.76
In the 2018 Communication on enhancing legal pathways to Europe, the Commission made no specific ref-
erence to climate-related mobility, even though it acknowledged that “controlled legal migration” should 
be facilitated both on the basis of market needs and “for humanitarian reasons” (emphasis added).77
In its positions during the GCM negotiations, the EU advocated facilitating opportunities for safe, orderly 
and regular migration but did not connect this with the need to minimize displacement of those most at 
risk due to the climate crisis,78 despite the EU being quite “vocal” on including people displaced by disas-
national Mechanism on Loss and Damage, 15 February 2018.
70  IOM, 2016, n 55.
71  See for example European Commission: COM(2011) 743 final, COM(2015) 240 final, and COM(2020) 609 final; European Parliament, 
Resolution 2015/2342(INI).
72  See for example European Commission: COM(2018) 635 final, COM(2019) 126 final, COM(2020) 609 final.
73  The Greens in the European Parliament, Position paper on “Climate change, refugees and migration” (2013); available at: http://rosamar-
tinez.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Greens-EFA-Position-Paper-Climate-Change-Refugees-and-Migration.pdf
74  SWD(2013) 138 final, respectively pp. 26 and 25.
75  COM(2013) 292 final, p. 12.
76  Mayrhofer and Ammer, 2014, n 59; Ammer et all, 2015, n 62.
77  COM(2018) 635 final.
78   EU input to the UN Secretary-General’s report on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (2017); available at: 
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ters and climate change in the GCM.79 The same applies to the EP, which in its resolution on the two Global 
Compacts, only referred to climate-related movements in relation to the importance to retaining a focus on 
“addressing the diverse drivers of irregular migration and forced displacement, [including] climate change 
and natural disasters”.80 Even though it recognized migration as a “proactive adaptation strategy” and advo-
cated “opening more legal pathways for migration”, it did not refer to that as being, inter alia, an important 
strategy to respond to climate-migration.
Similarly, none of the analysed EC’s documents on climate change adaptation and resilience mention mi-
gration as a possible mechanism to facilitate adaptation to adverse climate impacts.81 The EU dedicated 
policy framework on displacement, based on the Commission’s Communication “Lives in Dignity: from 
Aid-dependence to Self-reliance”82 and the Council Conclusions on forced displacement,83 also fail to ac-
knowledge migration as a solution to minimize climate-related displacement.84
The 2019 Commission Staff Working Document on “Fitness check on EU legislation on legal migration” in-
cludes a timid attempt to connect the dots, as the evaluation analysed the relevance of the EU legislation 
on legal migration with respect to “the socio-economic, environmental (including climate change) and 
security factors that are expected to be the main drivers of migration to the EU in the short/medium term 
(2030)”.85 However, the topic was not studied in great detail due to wide breath of the study in general, and 
the 2013 SWD was taken as the main reference document. Consequently, the Fitness Check only concluded 
that “there is a need to understand better and take greater account of the impact of evolving socio-eco-
nomic and environmental factors (including climate change) on the relevance of the acquis”.86
The 2020 Communication on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum only refers to climate change as a driver 
of migration and in relation to the tackling the root causes of irregular migration. While it includes some 
lines about the development of legal migration pathways to Europe, it once again fails to identify clear 
mechanisms to facilitate the mobility of those who might be at risk of displacement due to climate change. 
In any case, it is a widely shared observation that the EU policy on facilitating regular migration has been 
largely inadequate until now.87 This is mostly due to the Treaty of the European Union leaving “legal migra-
tion” as an area of shared competence between the EU and its MS. The EU’s actions are therefore severely 
limited by MS’ positions which, so far, have privileged containment of irregular migration over facilitation of 
safe, regular and orderly movements. As per the Commission’s own assessment, “the sharper political focus 
on addressing irregular migration has made it more and more difficult to develop an EU policy on legal 
migration, particularly beyond the highly skilled migrants”.88
The harmonization of EU rules on entry and residence have only concerned specific categories of migrants, 
such as highly skilled workers, students, scientific researchers, and seasonal workers. As observed in the 
Fitness Check report, important categories of migrant workers are not covered by the EU Directives, at 
least in terms of admission conditions, such as “non-seasonal low/medium-skilled workers, jobseekers, ser-
vice providers covered by the EU’s trade commitments except intra-corporate transferees, and the self-em-
https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/stocktaking_eu.pdf
79  Kälin, 2018, n 52.
80  EP, Resolution of 18 April 2018 on progress on the UN Global Compacts for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and on Refugees 
(2018/2642(RSP)).
81  EC, Communication on “The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises”, COM (2012) 586 final; EC, ‘Resilience Com-
pendium. Saving lives and livelihoods’ (2015); EC, ‘Building Resilience: the EU’s approach’ – Factsheet (2016); EC, Report on the implementation of 
the EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change, COM(2018) 738 final.
82  COM (2016) 234 final. 
83  See https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/12/conclusions-on-forced-displacement-and-development/ 
84  EP, Climate Change and Migration (2020); available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/655591/IPOL_
STU(2020)655591_EN.pdf 
85  SWD (2019) 1055, 29.
86  SWD (2019) 1055, 100.
87  P. De Bruycker, ‘Towards a New European Consensus on Migration and Asylum’, EU Migration Law Blog, 2 December 2019; available 
at: https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/towards-a-new-european-consensus-on-migration-and-asylum/; R. McLeman, ‘International migration and cli-
mate adaptation in an era of hardening borders’ (2019), Nature Climate Change, 9(12), 911.
88  SWD (2019) 1055, 5.
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ployed/entrepreneurs”.89 A limited fraction of people affected by the worst impacts of climate change and 
environmental degradation would therefore be covered by the existing EU legislation.90 While the Seasonal 
Migrant Worker Directive could be a tool for those willing to use seasonal migration as an adaptation strat-
egy, it has some important loopholes from a human rights perspective as highlighted by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Migrants.91 In addition, as per the Commission’s admission,92 conditions for the 
entry and circulation of highly-skilled workers regulated by the 2009 Blue Card directive are overly restric-
tive and the reform of the directive has been stalled for the past few years due to disagreement between 
MS. 
Moreover, the set-up and the implementation of several pilot projects on labour migration between se-
lected EU MS and certain African third countries has proved difficult due to “high operational costs, limited 
employer or migrant buy-in, and insufficient political support”.93 
Although the 2020 Commission’s Communication on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum recognizes the 
importance of facilitating “legal migration and mobility”, the document remains imprecise on the nature of 
the actions to be adopted and on a roadmap for regular migration.94 As argued by several NGOs, its propos-
als also lack ambition95 and frame labour migration as an issue of “attracting skills and talents”.
Scholars and independent institutions have also observed that the framework for orderly migration has 
been given a subordinated function to the prevailing imperative of controlling irregular migration, espe-
cially in the EU’s relation with countries of origin or transit.96 For example, Akermann, referring to the Joint 
Valletta Action Plan,97 observed that the EU “has used legal migration, and the issuing of visas, as a bar-
gaining chip with African countries, to force them to strengthen border security and to accept deported 
migrants”.98 Despite the promise of a “fresh start”, the Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum 
leaves this approach unchanged.99
To sum up, my analysis reveals on the one hand very limited recognition by the European Institutions that 
facilitating regular migration also represents an effective response to climate-related mobility. On the oth-
er hand, it shows that the EU’s actions to enhance regular migration pathways to Europe has been largely 
inadequate, providing little solace to the people most impacted by climate change.
4.4 Addressing displacement
 
Despite the many possible preventative strategies, climate-displacement remains inevitable under certain 
circumstances. “Addressing displacement” therefore refers to “measures to prepare for and respond to dis-
placement when it happens, including through ensuring assistance and protection for those on the move 
due to climate change, and seeking lasting solutions”.100 Measures include both those to be taken in the 
89  SWD(2019) 1055, 101.
90  Ammer and all, 2014, n 62. 
91  Mayrohfer and Ammer, 2014, n. 59.
92  COM(2018) 635 final
93  K. Hooper, ‘Exploring New Legal Migration Pathways: Lessons from Pilot Projects’ (2019), Migration Policy Institute, p. 5; available at: 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/exploring-new-legal-migration-pathways-lessons-pilot-projects
94  D. Ruy and E. Yayboke, ‘Deciphering the European Union’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum’, Centre for Strategic & International Stud-
ies, 29 September 2020; available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/deciphering-european-unions-new-pact-migration-and-asylum; E. Dempster 
and M. Clemens, ‘The EU Migration Pact: Putting Talent Partnerships into Practice’, Centre for Global Development, 19 November 2020; available at: 
https://www.cgdev.org/blog/eu-migration-pact-putting-talent-partnerships-practice 
95  NGOs joint statement, ‘The Pact on Migration and Asylum: to provide a fresh start and avoid past mistakes, risky elements need to 
be addressed and positive aspects need to be expanded’; available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2020/10/NGO-Statement-
Pact-Oct-2020-FINAL.pdf; ETUC Statement on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, 24 November 2020; available at: https://www.etuc.org/en/
document/etuc-statement-new-pact-migration-and-asylum 
96  De Bruycker, 2019, n 87.
97  The Plan was adopted at the EU-Africa Summit on Migration held at La Valletta, Malta, in November 2015. The action plan aims at en-
hancing migration governance between Europe and Africa and includes “[p]romoting regular migration channels for migration and mobility from 
and between European and African countries”.
98  M. Akermann, ‘Expanding the Fortress. The policies, the profiteers and the people shaped by EU’s border externalisation program’ 
(2018), Transnational Institute and Stop Wapenhandel, p. 38; available at: https://www.tni.org/en/publication/expanding-the-fortress
99  D. Ruy and E. Yayboke, 2020, n 94.
100  IOM, 2018, n 55, 6.a
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country of origin, such as contingency planning and humanitarian relief aid, and those to facilitate protec-
tion of people moving across borders, such as humanitarian protection measures to enable the temporary 
admission and stay, or non-return policies.101
In 2012, Coopers stated, “there is little foundation for claiming that Europe has, by any measure, addressed 
the growing protection gap created by disaster-induced displacement”.102 Unsurprisingly given the politi-
cal context and the EU restrictive approach to asylum and international protection, my analysis reveals that 
this statement continues to hold true. I will illustrate this by discussing the EU’s failure to amend relevant 
pieces of EU legislation or to harmonize European practices.
The Temporary Protection Directive (TPD), adopted in 2001, is considered to have some potential to pro-
vide responses at least to certain categories of people in need of international protection due to climate 
change. Although it contains no explicit reference to people moving due to disasters or climate change, 
many have supported the idea that it could cover mass influxes originated by rapid onset disasters, espe-
cially because the definition of “displaced persons” included in article 2(c) is not exhaustive.103 Even the 
Commission recognized this possibility in the 2013 SWD, although without specifying the circumstances 
under which it would consider the Directive to be applicable for environmentally-displaced persons.104 
However, looking at the travaux preparatoirs, Cooper has pointed out to the fact that the Finnish proposal 
to add “persons who have had to flee as a result of natural disasters” was opposed by Spain and Belgium 
on the basis that that category “was not mentioned in any international instrument on refugees.” 105  In ad-
dition, an EC study on the TPD did not mention its possible application to displacements related to climate 
change, disasters or the environment.106
Most authors also agree that the TPD would only be of limited use for the protection of people displaced 
in relation to climate change. First, it is only applicable in the event of a “mass influx” or imminent mass 
influx of displaced persons. While the directive does not define what constitutes a mass influx and leaves 
the decision to the Council on a case-by-case basis by a qualified majority and upon proposal by the Com-
mission, it is clear that the directive would not apply to individuals in need of protection who would not be 
arriving as part of a “mass influx”.107 Secondly, as per its name, the directive would only provide temporary 
protection and would therefore not represent an adequate response to those unable to return home after 
a set amount of time, including those whose territory may have become uninhabitable.108 
In addition, art 2(a) specifies that the Directive would apply “in particular if there is also a risk that the 
asylum system will be unable to process this influx without adverse effects for its efficient operation”, sug-
gesting the existence of another layer of conditions besides the objective need to provide temporary pro-
tection to people unable to return to their countries.
In any case, given the high political threshold for its activation, it has been impossible to activate the TPD 
even in more straight-forward cases, such as when Italy and Malta requested the Commission to propose 
its activation in 2011, following the arrival in several months of about 26,000 people on the Italian island 
of Lampedusa.109 Not even the arrival of over a million displaced people in 2015 and the consequent pres-
sures from the EP, UNHCR and civil society led to its activation.
101  Ibid; Nansen Initiative, 2015, n 2.
102  M. Cooper, ‘Migration and Disaster-Induced Displacement: European Policy, Practice, and Perspective’ (2012),  Center for Global Devel-
opment, Working Paper 308, 88; available at: https://www.cgdev.org/publication/migration-and-disaster-induced-displacement-european-poli-
cy-practice-and-perspective
103  V. Kolmannskog and F. Myrstad, ‘Environmental Displacement in European Asylum Law’ (2009), European Journal of Migration and Law, 
11(4), 313; W. Kälin, ‘Conceptualising climate-induced displacement’ in J. McAdam (ed.), Climate Change and Displacement. Multidisciplinary Perspec-
tives (Hart Publishing2010); EP, ‘Study on “Climate Refugees” – Legal and policy responses to environmentally-induced migration’ (2011); available 
at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL-LIBE_ET%282011%29462422 
104  Ammer et all, 2014, n. 62, 32.
105  Cooper, 2012, n 102, 48.
106  EC, Study on the Temporary Protection Directive (2016); available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-li-
brary/documents/policies/asylum/temporary-protection/docs/final_report_evaluation_tpd_en.pdf 
107  Kolmannskog and Myrstada, 2009, n 103.
108  Ibid; G. Sciaccaluga, ‘Sudden onset disasters, human displacement and the Temporary Protection Directive: space for a promising re-
lationship?’ (2018), RLI Working Paper Series Mini-volume (Papers 23–26); available at: https://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/9172/1/Mini-Vol_Environmen-
tal%20Displacement%20in%202018.pdf
109  Sciaccaluga, 2018, n 108.
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In September 2020, as part of the “new pact on migration and asylum” the Commission presented the 
proposal for a new regulation providing immediate protection in situations of crisis, which would repeal 
the TPD.110 While the proposal aims to simplify the activation process and increases the level of protection 
offered to eligible persons, the eligibility criteria have been defined much more narrowly than the TPD.111 It 
applies to “displaced persons who, in their country of origin, are facing an exceptionally high risk of being 
subject to indiscriminate violence, in a situation of armed conflict, and who are unable to return to that 
third country” (art 10), leaving very little hope that it could apply to people who are displaced in the con-
text of climate change.
The applicability of the Qualification Directive to people fleeing for environmental reasons was also a sub-
ject of debate.112 In particular, the discussion has revolved around its articles regulating subsidiary protec-
tion,113 which is a form of complementary protection for those who do not qualify as refugees under the 
Geneva Convention but cannot be returned home based on human rights law and customary international 
law. 
According to the Directive, people eligible to subsidiary protection are those who, if returned to their coun-
try of origin would face a real risk of suffering serious harm. Article 15 defines “serious harm” as a) death 
penalty or execution; b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the 
country of origin; or c)  serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate 
violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict. 
In 1999, during the consultation preceding the presentation of the first proposal, the Commission asked MS 
whether subsidiary protection should be extended to people displaced by “environmental disasters”.114 This 
option was finally not included in the first proposal and, although the Parliament claimed that cross-border 
environmental displaced persons ‘equally need protection’ and that ‘there is an urgent need to devise the 
appropriate instruments and policies of prevention”,115 this element was not included in the final text. Simi-
larly, the Commission’s original proposal included a wider formulation of article 15(c), providing subsidiary 
protection to all those displaced as ‘a result of systematic or generalized violations of their human rights’, 
but was then amended by the Council.116
Although grounds for “serious harm” do not explicitly mention environmentally-displaced people, some 
believe that the article 15(b) could be used to extend subsidiary protection to that category, specifical-
ly when, after extreme disasters or degradation, returning the persons to their country of origin would 
amount to torture or cruel and inhuman treatment.117 
The Commission took a different view in the 2013 SWD where it stated that the Directive does ‘not in-
clude environmental degradation nor climate change amongst the types of serious harm which can lead 
to granting such protection’ (p. 18). However, this conclusion was poorly explained and failed to take into 
account the potential effect of returning a person to a certain situation after extreme disasters and other 
forms of environmental degradation.118 This has become more evident following the 2020 decision by the 
UN Human Rights Committee in the case Teitiota v. New Zealand, indicating that returning someone to 
a country where, due to the climate crisis, their life is at risk, or in danger of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment could be unlawful.119 The European Commission should therefore dedicate the necessary atten-
110  COM(2020) 613 final.
111  I.G. Meltem, ‘What a difference two decades make? The shift from temporary to immediate protection in the New European Pact on 
Migration and Asylum’, EU Migration Law Blog, 11 November 2020; available at: https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/what-a-difference-two-decades-
make-the-shift-from-temporary-to-immediate-protection-in-the-new-european-pact-on-asylum-and-migration/#more-3339 
112  The Directive was first adopted in 2004 (2004/83/EC), then recast in 2011 (2011/95/EU) and a proposal for a Regulation Directive was 
issued in 2016 but has not been adopted yet.
113  Art. 2(e) and 15 in the 2004 Directive and 2(f ) and 15 in the 2011 version.
114  Kolmanskogg and Myrstad, 2009; EP, 2011, n 107.
115  EP, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Report, 2002, Doc. A5-0333/2002; available at: https://www.europarl.europa.
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117  Kolmanskogg and Myrstad, 2009, n 114; Mayrhofer and Ammer, 2014, n 59.
118  Mayrhofer and Ammer, 2014, n 59; Ammer et all, 2014, n 62.
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tion to ensure MS follow this decision and also UNHCR guidance120 when assessing claims for international 
protection made in the context of the adverse effects of climate change and disasters. 
The Commission has shown no interest in reforming the Qualification Directive to provide a clear refer-
ence to people displaced in connection with environmental factors. The Greens in the European Parliament 
lamented that “the relevant article was not opened for amendments in the recast proposals, completed in 
2011”.121 Similarly, a proposal for a Qualification Regulation (QR) issued in 2016 contains nothing on this as-
pect.122 The Parliament’s Rapporteur sought to expand the concept of serious harm as set out in Article 16 
of the proposal to include, among others, “severe violations of human rights or events seriously disturbing 
public order”.123 However, this proposal did not receive sufficient political support within Parliament and 
therefore did not make it into its mandate for negotiations with the Council. Since this mandate for nego-
tiations has not changed after the 2019 elections and does not include any reference to climate change or 
environmental degradation, the possibility of a reform in this regard remain remote even when the nego-
tiations on the QR proposal re-start.
Previous analysis of MS legislation revealed that only Finland and Sweden adopted provisions to explicitly 
provide protection to people displaced for environmental reasons, while in several other countries, legisla-
tion is broad enough to allow for progressive interpretation.124 
However, the failure to harmonize such protection mechanisms and achieve a “regional disaster-related 
displacement protection scheme”125 has led states towards a race to the bottom, with Sweden and Finland 
rolling back on their model legislation. Following the arrival of a large number of asylum-seekers in Europe 
in 2015, Finland and Sweden repealed (although temporarily in the case of Sweden) their provisions on hu-
manitarian protection, which included environmentally displaced people.126 This was due to the fear that 
their more progressive legislation compared to other MS would have led to receiving a disproportionate 
number of people in need of protection.
This example shows the importance for the EU to take harmonised action to address the protection needs 
of cross-border displaced people who reach EU territory. Unfortunately, Europe was among the few regions 
not covered by the process of regional consultations hold by the Nansen Initiative, mostly due to budget 
constraints but also to the perception that Europe was less of a priority given the regime of free circulation 
within the EU and the less likelihood of Europe receiving cross-border disaster-displaced persons from 
third countries. Similarly, by early 2020, within the PDD, discussions on how to promote harmonization 
among European countries of humanitarian protection for cross-border disaster displaced persons have 
yet to start.
In summary, my analysis paints a bleak picture of the EU’s willingness and capacity to fill the legal and pol-
icy gaps in ensuring adequate protection to people fleeing in relation with climate change, with restrictive 
interpretations of existing EU legislation and failure to adopt relevant amendments in European law and to 
harmonize domestic laws. 
120  UNHCR, Legal considerations regarding claims for international protection made in the context of the adverse effects of climate change 
and disasters, 1 October 2020, ; available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5f75f2734.html 
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doceo/document/A-8-2017-0245_EN.html   
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ent national practices concerning granting of non-EU harmonised protection statuses – Synthesis Report’ (2010); available at: https://ec.europa.eu/
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126  E. Hush, ‘Developing a European Model of International Protection for Environmentally-Displaced Persons: Lessons from Finland and 
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5. Factors influencing the EU response
The previous chapter identified the insufficient EU response to human mobility in the context of climate 
change over the last decade, with the issue of climate-related mobility emerging mostly within discourses 
and strategies to prevent irregular migration and displacement and a lack of political will to facilitate labour 
migration as a form of adaptation and to provide protection in Europe to people displaced in connection 
with climate change.
To deepen the analysis, this chapter discusses possible factors that have contributed to shape EU’s policies, 
legislation, and positions on this topic.
5.1 Complexity of the issue
 
The issue of human mobility in the context of climate change is undeniably complex. As we have seen, 
scholars and institutions have often taken diverging opinions on how to conceptualise the problem and 
on best possible solutions to recommend and implement. 
The exact role played by environmental factors in influencing mobility decisions, the mobility patterns of 
those who move in relation to environmental reasons, the degree of voluntariness in mobility decisions 
when environmental factors are at play, and the specific protection needs of those who move in connec-
tion with environmental reasons are among the difficult questions that academics and policy-makers have 
struggled with. 
Despite the large amount of research commissioned by the EU to fill knowledge gaps, EU decision-mak-
ing has undoubtedly been affected by persisting uncertainties. As stated by the Commission in the SWD, 
“gaps in conceptualising environmentally-induced migration hamper policy-making”.127 A symptom of this 
conceptual challenges is the lack of an agreed definition, which also affects EU institutions.128 Another is 
the difficulty of quantifying the phenomenon, resulting in different approaches and reactions by different 
European institutions. 
My analysis reveals the coexistence within European institutions of different framings and approaches, 
such as the securitization and the development ones. This confirms Mayrhofer and Ammer’s assessment in 
2014, that the complexity of the issue makes it difficult for the EU to achieve “a distinct EU position not to 
speak of a coherent policy and legal framework”.129
5.2 Different entities involved 
 
The issue of human mobility in the context of climate change is inter-disciplinary. It falls at the intersec-
tion of multiple policy areas, such as migration and asylum, climate change, humanitarian aid, disaster 
risk reduction, development cooperation, and external relations. Within the Commission, this means the 
involvement of at least four different Directorates (respectively DG Home, DG Clima, DG ECHO, DG DevCo). 
Each of these directorates approaches the issue applying their specific perspective to the issue. The EU’s 
diplomatic service, the European External Action Service – EEAS, is also a key actor, with its own viewpoint.
The result is difficulty in implementing a coordinated and effective migration policy in general and the 
on-going lack of a specific policy to address the issue of human mobility related to climate change and oth-
er environmental reasons, despite the wealth of EU-funded research and policy papers.130 The only official 
document dedicated to the topic, the 2013 SWD, does not represent a fully-fledged policy.
127  SWD(2013) 138 final, 12.
128  Mayrhofer and Ammer, 2014, n 59.
129  Ibid, 398.
130  E. Petrillo ‘Environmental Migrations from Conflict-Affected Countries: Focus on EU Policy Response’ (2015),  The Hague Institute for 
Global Justice, Working Paper 6; available at: http://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Working-Pa-
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Similarly, my research identifies some disparities in how and how much different Commission Directorates 
and different EU institutions raise the issue in different fora. For example, on the one hand the EU, mostly 
through the EEAS, has championed the issue of climate-related mobility by funding the research and con-
sultations within the Nansen Initiative and being an active member of the steering group of both the Ini-
tiative and the PDD and co-chairing the Group of Friends of the PDD, as well as  by promoting the inclusion 
of the topic in the GCM. Also, DG DevCo is currently funding a project to support Pacific island countries 
to strengthen their response to disaster displacement.131  On the other hand, DG Home appears less pro-
active on the issue, with no interest shown in promoting the reform of relevant EU laws on international 
protection and only a timid recent acknowledgement of the need to further monitor the impacts of climate 
change on migratory flows to assess the relevance of EU legislation on regular migration.132 Concerning 
DG Clima, although it engages on this topic mainly through the TFD in the UNFCCC, my analysis of key 
policy documents on climate change shows that little attention is paid to climate-related mobility. For ex-
ample, only one reference was found in pre-COP negotiating positions,133 indicating that the EU might not 
be attaching a high importance to the topic within climate change negotiations. Despite climate change 
figuring high on top of the agenda for the current President of the Commission, no reference was found 
to proposed solutions to the issue of climate-related mobility in her speeches, nor in recent Commission’s 
proposals on climate change.134
5.3 Role of member states in asylum and immigration policies
 
Compared to other fields, asylum and immigration are areas where the process of “Europeanisation” is still 
young. Before the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the European Community had no role in coor-
dinating immigration and asylum policies. While the Maastricht Treaty brought these areas into EU compe-
tence, it nevertheless left MS largely in charge of decision-making through the Council.135 The Amsterdam 
Treaty diminished the power of the Council, but it was only the Lisbon Treaty, entered into force in 2009, 
that made Parliament a co-legislator on an equal footing with the Council, with the exception of provision-
al measures to be taken in the event of a sudden inflow of third-country nationals.136
Even with these important changes, reaching a truly common immigration policy has proved difficult, as 
has been achieving a truly integrated Common European Asylum System, mostly due to disagreements 
between states which have translated into blockages at different levels. Particularly in the area of immi-
gration, reaching a ‘common immigration policy’, as mandated by the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), has been complicated by the fact that, while the EU is competent to “lay down 
the conditions governing entry into and legal residence in a Member State”,137 MS retain the “right to de-
termine volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their territory to 
seek work”.138 The importance that MS attribute to this principle is evidenced by the multiple reassurances 
issued by the EU during the GCM negotiations about the fact that the GCM did “not entail any transfer or 
restriction of national sovereign rights or competences” and that it could “not change the allocation of 
competences between the European Union and its Member States”.139 Despite these reassurances, three EU 
MS decided to vote against the official adoption of the GCM at the UNGA in December 2018, while another 
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133  Council of the EU, Council conclusions on the Paris Agreement and preparations for the UNFCCC meetings, 2017; available at: https://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/10/13/conclusions-paris-agreement-and-unfccc-meetings/ 
134  Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session by Ursula von der Leyen, Candidate for President of the European Commis-
sion, 16 July 2019; available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_19_4230; Speech in the European Parliament Ple-
nary Session Ursula von der Leyen President-elect of the European Commission, 27 November 2019; available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/
files/president-elect-speech-original_en.pdf; Speech by President von der Leyen on the occasion of the COP25 in Madrid, 2 December 2019; available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_19_6651; EC, Communication on “The European Green New Deal”, COM(2019) 
640 final
135  Cooper, 2012, n 102.
136  EP, Factsheet on European Immigration Policy; available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/152/immigration-pol-
icy
137  Ibid.
138  TFEU, art 79(5).
139  EC, ‘What is the Global Compact For Safe, Orderly And Regular Migration? Memo, 14 November 2018; available at: https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_18_6417
24 Refugee Law Initiative Working Paper 54
five abstained.140
Given the role maintained by MS in decision-making on immigration and asylum and how sensitive this 
issue has been for European countries over the last decades, it is not surprising that the EU response to 
human mobility in the context of climate change has not been more progressive, and not even very devel-
oped.
5.4 EU migration and asylum policies focused on containment 
 
Influenced as it is by MS’s interests, the EU policy on migration and asylum has always revolved around 
the imperative to restrict migrants’ arrival, stay and circulation in the EU territory. It was not a coincidence 
that the “communitarisation”141 of asylum and immigration policies overlapped with the completion of the 
European internal market, which included the free circulation of people. The need for common immigra-
tion and asylum rules regulating the entrance and circulation of non-EU citizens was regarded as a way of 
counter-balancing the abolition of internal borders.142
When the EU realised that domestic border control measures were not sufficient to stop or reduce migrant 
flows towards Europe, it increasingly tried to prevent migration through cooperation with countries of 
origin and transit.143 The so-called “external dimension” of EU immigration and asylum policies, developed 
since the Tampere European Council in 1999, is based on a double approach. The first is the externalization 
of migration policies, which consists in demanding third countries to adopt policies and practices of border 
and migration control that serve the EU interests, as well as enhancing mechanisms to ensure the return 
and readmission of irregular migrants to their countries of origin.144 The second, although less prevalent, is 
the “root causes approach”, which focuses on preventing migration and displacement by tackling the root 
causes that lead people to move. Both approaches are based on increased cooperation and partnerships 
with countries of origin and transit and on the mainstreaming of migration considerations in all EU external 
policies. The result is an EU external migration policy which is to be “firmly embedded in the EU’s overall 
foreign policy, including development cooperation, and better aligned with the EU’s internal policy prior-
ities.”145 
The external dimension of EU immigration and asylum gained further strength after the huge increase in 
asylum-seekers’ arrivals in 2015. The Agenda for Migration identifies cooperation with third countries as a 
central element in all its four pillars. The Partnership Framework on Migration, launched in 2016, involves 
the conclusion of agreements on migration with countries of origin and transit and is based on a system 
of “positive and negative incentives”, or a “carrot-and stick approach” in which development cooperation 
and visa policies are used as a tool to ensure cooperation on border control.146 The Emergency Trust Fund 
for Africa, set up in 2015, is the “flagship instrument in tackling the root causes of irregular migration”147 
which however has been criticised for using development and humanitarian aid funds in large part for se-
curity measures and border management projects.148 The Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum 
confirms this approach, despite its promise of a “change of paradigm” in migration cooperation with third 
countries.149
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This background provides some clues to interpret the EU response to climate-related mobility. It may ex-
plain why EU positions to “avert” climate-related displacement are more developed than those aimed at 
“minimizing” and “addressing” it. It also shows some possible limitations of the “root causes approach” to 
avert climate-related displacement if its intention is mostly weighting towards preventing migration rather 
than protecting the rights of people at risk of displacement. In addition, it reveals some contradictions, in 
as far as measures to tackle the root causes are made dependant to third countries’ cooperation on migra-
tion control.
5.5 The 2015 “refugee crisis”
 
The arrival in Europe of more than one million asylum-seekers and migrants in 2015 sparked a variety of 
different responses from MS, with some opening their borders, like Germany, and others shutting their 
doors to refugees in need of protection. This situation “exposed serious flaws in the EU’s asylum system”.150 
It also ignited national debates about migration, with far-right parties exploiting the “crisis” for political 
gains. As a result of this further politicization of the migration issue, the EU, under pressure from MS, has ad-
opted even more restrictive and control-oriented policies, as briefly touched upon in the previous section. 
The consequences have been harsh for migrants and refugees, pushed even more to undertake perilous 
journeys, trapped in unsafe third countries like Turkey and even more in Libya, and even less able to access 
international protection and safe regular pathways to migration.
This perceived crisis should have been the opportunity to reflect on how to make the EU asylum and im-
migration system more capable of providing access and protection to those fleeing in relation to natural 
disasters and climate change. However, there are no indications that this occurred, and on the contrary the 
issue of human mobility in the context of climate change seem to occupy an even less prominent position 
in the EU policy-making agenda,151 probably because that is perceived as a future problem in contrast with 
“contemporary migration and asylum issues that the EU has to cope with”.152
What is certain is that the recent political climate makes even more remote the possibility of expanding 
protection mechanisms to people displaced in the context of climate change or to open up labour mar-
kets.153 Even in the current EP, which has so far been the most progressive European institution on this issue, 
the prospective of adopting resolutions or own-initiative reports capable of taking a decisive stand on this 
issue appear remote, given the current composition and difficulties of building a majority.
The EU’s insistence on maintaining a rigid distinction between migrants and refugees does not matches 
the reality of human mobility in the context of climate change. In this regard, it is worth noting the Euro-
pean Council’s note to delegations on negotiations of the GCM, dated 15 June 2018, which stated that the 
final text should “preserves the distinction between migrants and refugees while recognizing the need to 
address specific vulnerabilities resulting from natural disasters and environmental degradation without 
creating new legal categories” and recommended avoiding the inclusion of a new objective on climate 
change.154
The implementation of the GCM could be an opportunity to revisit some of the EU positions and take fur-
ther steps to ensure adequate actions to minimize and address displacement related to climate change. 
However, there is a real risk that the EU, like other parties, could “pick and choose on different objectives”, 
Migration Law Blog, 8 December 2020; available at: https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/eu-cooperation-on-migration-with-partner-countries-within-
the-new-pact-new-instruments-for-a-new-paradigm/#more-3432 
150  European Parliament, ‘Asylum and migration in the EU: facts and figures’, updated 30 October 2020; available at: https://www.europarl.
europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78630/asylum-and-migration-in-the-eu-facts-and-figures
151  Green European Foundation (GEF) ‘Climate Refugees and Climate Migration’ (2019); available at: https://gef.eu/publication/climate-ref-
ugees-and-climate-migration/
152  R. Vestita, ‘Environmentally Displaced Persons in Europe: Limits of the Legal 
Protection of this Controversial Category of Migrants’ (2017), Kent Student Law Review, p. 30; available at: https://journals.kent.ac.uk/index.php/kslr/
article/view/342
153  GEF, 2019, n 151; M.G. Manieri, ‘Asylum in a Climate-Changed World: Bridging the Protection Gap in the EU’ (2020), Green European 
Journal; available at: https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/asylum-in-a-climate-changed-world-bridging-the-protection-gap-in-the-eu/  
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prioritising only those in which they have more pressing interests motivated by migration containment 
imperatives.155
155  Manieri, 2020, n 153.
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6. Conclusions 
This research shows that the EU response to human mobility in the context of climate change has been 
patchy, under-developed and generally inadequate. It is also marked by stark contradictions. On the one 
hand, the EU considers itself to be at the forefront of efforts to address climate-related mobility.156 It is 
one of the major funders of empirical research on environmental migration, and particularly on migra-
tion-as-adaptation approaches.157 It has also played a very active role in the Nansen Initiative and PDD 
and has advocated the inclusion of the climate-migration nexus in relevant policy frameworks, and par-
ticularly in the GCM.158 On the other hand, my analysis reveals that the climate-migration nexus is mostly 
mentioned in relation to policies and actions aimed at tackling the root causes of migration and avoiding 
displacement and irregular migration, or in relation to mobility among third countries. Conversely, very 
little has been done to facilitate more regular migration pathways as a way to provide options to those 
living in areas severely affected by climate impacts, and nothing has been put in place to ensure effective 
protection in Europe of people displaced in relation to climate change. 
This analysis is consistent with those of other authors159 who, especially after the publication of the SWD, 
pointed out that climate-related mobility is mostly seen by the EU as a matter of external relations, to be 
dealt with either through development cooperation, DRR and climate adaptation and mitigation to ad-
dress its root causes, or through humanitarian aid for people moving internally or across borders in third 
countries. This approach is also visible within the Nansen Initiative/PDD, where the EU has generally been 
playing a leading role, but this engagement has not translated yet into discussions to enhance harmoniza-
tion of protection measures at EU level or to facilitate “migration-as-adaptation” towards Europe. 
The EU response to climate-related mobility reflects some of the most prevailing academic and policy 
discourses. For example, the “securitization” approach is focused on avoiding the conditions that makes 
people wanting to reach Europe. Even when EU institutions have embraced the “migration as adaptation” 
discourse, this has been applied to third countries but not to facilitate migration towards Europe. The EU 
response is also a reflection of the EU’s general approach to migration, and particularly of the EU external 
dimension of immigration and asylum policies, which have aimed at integrating migration consideration in 
all EU external policies for the purpose of fostering EU strategies to contain mobility towards Europe, even 
more so after the 2015 “refugee crisis”. 
In this light, although interventions to avoid displacement related to climate change are much needed, 
the fact that the EU response to human mobility in the context of climate change is prevalently orient-
ed towards “averting” displacement casts a doubt about the genuine intentions of such actions. The EU 
case study therefore shows the importance of responding to climate-related mobility in a comprehensive 
manner, where measures to avert displacement are accompanied by actions aimed at facilitating labour 
mobility and by others aimed at enhancing protection of those displaced, not only in third countries but 
also in Europe.
The EU case study also reveals a total lack of attention paid to “climate justice” considerations. This reflects 
the prevailing policy frameworks at international level that, although structured around a multi-dimen-
sional approach to “avert”, “minimize” and “address” displacement, leave more political issues related to 
responsibility and liability completely aside. Such alignment comes as no surprise, knowing the stark op-
position to those concepts by developed countries, including the EU, and given that the current policy 
frameworks have been elaborated through intergovernmental processes, in which the EU has played an 
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important role. However, the EU cannot ignore its responsibility for climate change. Nor can it use the ob-
servation that climate-related mobility mostly affects third countries to neglect its responsibility to provide 
effective solutions to all those forced to move in the context of climate change, including those who reach 
Europe. These are crucial considerations to design truly comprehensive responses to climate-migration. 
Consequently, further advocacy is needed from climate justice activists to bring elements of responsibility 
and justice into current policy frameworks regulating states’ responses to human mobility in the context 
of climate change. Similarly, further research is needed to find a suitable manner to “re-politicise” the issue 
generally, and particularly at the EU level. 
This could entail adopting climate justice considerations as a cross-cutting issue that needs to underpin all 
actions to “avert”, “minimize” and “address” displacement. For an entity like the EU, which has a high share 
of responsibility for the climate crisis, this could mean contributing to averting climate-displacement by 
reducing its emissions in a manner that respects its fair share. It could also imply “minimizing” displacement 
by recognizing its responsibility to redress the heighten risk of displacement due to climate change and 
consequently facilitating regular migration towards Europe. It could also entail “addressing” climate-relat-
ed mobility on the one hand by making sufficient funds available to adequately address the loss and dam-
ages suffered by displaced people, and on the other hand by establishing clear protection mechanism to 
admit and integrate in EU territory displaced people who cannot return to their countries due to the severe 
impacts of climate change.
